AI gateway, policy engine, MCP supply-chain protection, real-time DLP and cost control — consolidated into one auditable control plane that sees and governs every AI request as it happens.
Built in Helsinki for regulated European enterprises — no US Cloud Act exposure.Governing every model your teams already use
Watch requests, blocked attempts and DLP redactions in real time.
Learn more →Every principal mapped, connected and continuously risk-scored.
Learn more →Govern every Model Context Protocol server your agents touch.
Learn more →Discover, score and govern every AI agent and MCP server.
Learn more →Route any model through the gateway with one set of keys.
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Write a rule once — it protects every team, every model and every request, from a single control plane.
Every request from every model — chat, agents and MCP tool calls — routed through one inline enforcement point, so nothing reaches a provider unseen or unlogged.
Composable CEL policies evaluated at runtime, versioned and testable, so the same rule protects every team and every model without a single code change.
PII, secrets and source code detected and redacted in flight — on every prompt and every response — before a single token crosses your perimeter.
Trust graphs and lethal-trifecta detection across every Model Context Protocol server your agents reach, with policy enforced on each individual tool call.
Access certifications and the full lifecycle for every principal — human and non-human — with periodic reviews, attestations and one-click revocation.
Per-team token attribution, hard ceilings and a throttle mode that keeps enforcement running even after the budget is spent — security never lapses.
Route 2,000+ models and 500+ MCP servers & tools — OpenAI, Anthropic, Gemini, Mistral and any OpenAI-compatible endpoint — through a single control plane.
Built and operated in Finland, deployable as EU-hosted SaaS or fully on-premise — engineered against the regulations your auditors actually ask about.
Everything you need to know about the Roder control plane.
Spin up an EU-hosted trial in under an hour, or talk to the team that built it. Either way, you'll see every request by the end of the day.
The Model Context Protocol gives agents real tools. Here is how to grant that power without inheriting an exfiltration problem.
MCP did for agent tooling what the USB port did for hardware. One protocol, and suddenly every agent can reach every tool. That is exactly why it needs governing.
The Model Context Protocol is a genuine step forward. It lets an agent discover and call tools through a single, consistent interface, so a model can read a file, query a database or hit an internal API without bespoke glue for each one. The catch is that most MCP servers are written by someone else, and an agent reads a server’s tool descriptions as instructions. That puts all three legs of the lethal trifecta inside one component.
The lethal trifecta, as Simon Willison framed it, needs private data, untrusted content and a way out. A third-party MCP server can supply every one of them.
A team adds a useful third-party MCP server. It ships tools, and tool descriptions that the model treats as guidance.
The agent trusts the server the first time it sees it. Nothing pins the server’s identity or proves it has not changed.
The server updates. A tool description quietly gains a new line, a classic rug pull, and the agent follows it.
A poisoned tool call routes data to the attacker, wrapped inside a transfer the agent was always allowed to make.
An MCP server is dependency code with a voice. It can speak directly to the model on every call, so a benign install today can turn hostile on its next version, and the agent has no built-in reason to notice.
The fix is the same discipline you would apply to any untrusted dependency, made specific to agents. Pin identity with trust-on-first-use, so a server cannot silently become a different one. Require an Ed25519 signature on every server and rule-pack, so a changed tool description fails verification. Hold each tool to least privilege, so the pivot has nowhere to go. Wrap it in mTLS, and keep a full, immutable audit of every call. Each control removes one leg of the trifecta.
Roder puts every agent and MCP server on a live trust graph: discovered, scored, pinned and kill-switched, with signing and an audit trail underneath. A server that drifts loses its signature and its access in the same moment, before a single poisoned call goes through.
Pin, sign and least-privilege every agent and MCP server, with a full audit underneath.